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objects per se and on quick and ready solutions 
instead of fully analysing the possible impact of 
interventions over a long span of time. Against the 
limitations typical of the discipline of architecture, 
Esther Charlesworth introduces the figure of the 
architect as a pathologist who ‘diagnoses the frac-
tured urban condition, analysing and prescribing 
remedies for dysfunctional and often still politically 
contested cities.ʼ2 Nate Berg reframes the architect 
as a diplomat with the power to influence deci-
sions by reconsidering the complex relationship 
between human culture and space.3 Sultan Barakat 
assigns architects the role of potential negotiators 
of post-conflict built environment politics.4 All these 
positions recommend a two-way dialogue between 
architects and all the other participants to rethink 
their capacity and influence in post-war contexts: on 
the one hand multidisciplinary teams help to explore 
areas of interdependence across many fields, while 
the members of traumatised communities can also 
actively take part in every stage of the regeneration 
process.5 
Local communities thus emerge as the main 
beneficiary of any intervention of reconstruction. 
Indeed conflicts affect inhabitants, their daily habits 
and how they use the city: their trust of neighbours 
and administrators, their fears and their prospects 
for the future. The trauma goes beyond mere phys-
ical destruction, harshly manifested in damaged 
buildings and physical symbols, but it has significant 
implications for spatial organisation and dynamics. 
Spatial aspects may thus assume a relevant role 
An urban design strategy for post-conflict 
reconstruction
The tasks of reconstruction in post-conflict areas are 
critical and complicated. Recent investigations into 
the role of architects in this field have questioned 
all previous beliefs about reconstruction processes 
and, specifically, urban design in post-conflict situ-
ations. These studies consider the experience of 
some architects involved in reconstruction projects 
around the world, and point out how post-conflict 
reconstruction paradigms, valid until the Marshall 
Plan after the Second World War, have now been 
revealed as obsolete. These considerations have 
emerged upon reflection on the nature of contempo-
rary conflicts and how they differ from the past. The 
first difference concerns the opponents facing each 
other in a conflict, who are often non-state actors 
and are not clearly identified. Secondly, conflicts 
have changed geographically: neutral stages 
of conflict do not exist anymore, as they are fully 
embedded in the urban environment and integrated 
with the local population. These sensitive areas, the 
ones most dramatically affected by war in terms of 
civilian involvement, often remain under stress even 
after peace has been established. This is usually 
the result of the lack of clear solutions and the diffi-
culties in instituting steady conditions of peace.1
This shift brings to the fore the limits of archi-
tects and of the whole architecture practice in the 
context of post-war reconstruction. Architects never 
think about reconstruction in terms of psychological 
reconstruction: usually they focus more on building 
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the traditional discipline of urban design education 
looks for neutral fields of intervention in a context 
where neutrality doesn ‘t exist. 
Strategies are deemed good when they are 
based on processes of engagement through signifi-
cant work in the field, and when they attach primary 
importance to the link between the social and 
spatial syntax of a specific context.10 Two such stra-
tegic urban development plans were formulated by 
UN-Habitat in Somalia and in Kenya. The sustain-
able urbanisations of Bossaso and Homa Bay are 
pursued with participatory approaches that include 
all stakeholders. The plans employ a spatial analysis 
that is used as a tool for understanding dynamics, 
problems, and development opportunities. While 
participatory planning may provide good urban 
governance that could be responsive to the needs 
of the citizens and promotes economic development 
through the right management of resources, spatial 
analysis offers a technical base for discussion to 
sustain urban strategic planning processes. The 
combination of participatory planning and spatial 
analysis is considered a prerequisite to design 
specific projects integrated into the city develop-
ment plans.11 
Traditional professional training is grounded in 
the ‘faith in the transformative powers of design 
where a harmonious social context is taken more 
or less for granted.ʼ12 Avoiding positivist approaches 
and abstract rules, some recent urban rehabilita-
tion strategies and practices – implemented in 
metropolises of the Southern hemisphere – effect 
the transformation of the social context through 
design. The infrastructure system – made of esca-
lators together with new public libraries and public 
spaces – in the Comuna 13 district of Medellin in 
Colombia, one of the poorest districts of that city,13 
and the urban acupuncture implemented in Curitiba 
by Jaime Lerner, major of the city,14 are only some 
episodes of a panorama of methodologies that 
integrates city dynamics with economic processes 
for the establishment of peace, the prevention 
of threats, and to reach social stability within the 
large framework of reconstruction activities in post-
conflict situations.6 Examining local problems that 
emerged during the conflict as well as those existing 
beforehand, in the light of their spatial manifestation 
allows one to understand the physical environment 
where traumatised communities live and the side 
effects that conflicts have on everyday life. Looking 
at these spatial aspects to learn from them has the 
advantage of avoiding consolidated and top-down 
formulas; on the contrary it forces one to look for 
alternative solutions and to evaluate their adapt-
ability to the specificity of the context. 
This article will illustrate the Inclusive Urban 
Strategy and Action Plan, proposed by a multidisci-
plinary team, together with the municipal office and 
a local consulting firm for the post-conflict area of the 
north-eastern neighbourhoods of Bab Al-Tabbaneh 
and Jebel Mohsen in the city of Tripoli in Lebanon. 7 
[Fig. 1] Since 2007, a bloody civil war, caused by a 
violent ethnic conflict with regional relevance, has 
severely depleted the urban environment. It has 
had grave social and economic consequences and 
generated a strong urban partitioning. The Inclusive 
Urban Strategy and Action Plan is grounded in 
case studies of partitioned cities like Beirut, Mostar, 
Jerusalem, Belfast, and Nicosia, where ‘intercom-
moned rivalry threatens normal urban functioning 
and security.ʼ8 In partitioned cities the notion of 
public welfare is mostly absent because of a dishar-
monious situation generated by the combination 
of multiple factors: the fraught engagement with 
discredited political mechanisms, the marginalisa-
tion of local professionals, and the erosion of the 
contract between local government and the citizens. 
These case studies bring to the fore how the field of 
urban planning has been slow to acknowledge both 
partitioned cities and post-conflict areas, thus to 
build a professional literature that could support ‘the 
development and critique of strategic approaches 
to ethnic division.ʼ9 This happened mostly because 
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Fig. 1: Context map of Tripoli, Al-Mina and the location of the study area on the eastern side of Abu Ali River. Source: 
Abu Mrad et al., Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen.
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fabric of the city including heritage buildings, and 
the depletion of ecological resources gave shape 
to new partitions and altered the social geography 
of the area. As Robert Bevan points out, an objec-
tive of warring parties and an active and systematic 
means of conducting hostilities, is to damage signif-
icant structures and places.16
The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan was 
initiated by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of 
USAID (the United States Agency for International 
Development), a leading US government agency 
active in areas of extreme global poverty to enable 
resilient, democratic societies to realise their poten-
tial.17 The OTI was supported locally by Beyond 
Reform and Development, a Lebanese consulting 
firm offering the strategic framework in the area, and 
providing support and assistance to the municipality 
of Tripoli for the development of a strategic action 
plan.18 Moreover, the OTI supported the munici-
pality in establishing a local development office 
and provided in-kind grants to support a strategic 
plan delineated into five sectors: health, educa-
tion, employment, civic engagement and urban 
planning. The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action 
Plan is part of the urban planning section and was 
formulated between August 2014 and January 
2015 by a multi-disciplinary team of experts that 
included architects, landscape architects, urban 
designers and activists, to tackle the complexity and 
the multi-faced aspects, often contradictory, of the 
study area. The elaboration of the strategy started 
immediately after the Lebanese armed forces and 
the international security forces had implemented 
a security plan that guaranteed a period of relative 
calm. The team worked in constant collaboration 
with Beyond Reform and Development and the 
municipality of Tripoli, and with the participation of 
the local community and NGOs and associations 
present in the area. 
The main objectives behind this joint venture was 
to offer a new convincing, realisable and shared 
through the institution of a set of tools. 
The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan 
is grounded in the knowledge of this literature, 
combining partition cities, strategies in post-conflict 
areas and urban design principles. Its ambitious 
task is to tackle the complexity of problems and the 
multi-layered implications existing in Tripoli with a 
holistic and fully comprehensive plan of actions. 
Aims are not limited to the reconstruction of a shat-
tered city but they look forward to urban renewal 
to guarantee the socio-economic rehabilitation 
of Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen and the 
regeneration of the whole Tripoli metropolitan area, 
formulating shared visions and credible hypotheses 
to foster peace in the area.
The paradigmatic shift of the Inclusive Urban 
Strategy and Action Plan
Tripoli is a very significant case study in the field of 
post-conflict interventions because it is an example 
of a modern conflict that presents an interlace of 
local issues with international implications: its terri-
tory is a sort of game board where diverse interests 
play with the dramatic involvement of the local 
community. In fact the conflict had the local dimen-
sion of civil war, manifest in the clashes between the 
community of Sunni, established in the neighbour-
hood of Bab Al-Tabbaneh, and the Alawite group 
settled in Jebel Mohsen. [Fig. 2] The tribal opposi-
tion of the two close communities had been fueled 
by international political interests, and most signifi-
cantly by the tense relationship between Lebanon 
and Syria, by the ongoing war in Syria and by 
sporadic infiltrations by ISIS. As in other partitioned 
cities, the prolonged civil war had undermined the 
urban contract established between citizens and the 
untrustworthy urban managers.15 Indeed residents 
have been left alone to meet their needs elsewhere, 
like sending children to schools in adjacent neigh-
bourhoods or using health care facilities located in 
villages outside Tripoli. The limited accessibility of 
basic infrastructure, the destruction of the physical 
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Fig. 2: The demarcation line between Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen. Photo: Elias Abou Mrad.
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and the action plan composed of the phasing and 
implementation tools for the efficient realisation of 
the strategy. The methodology used eschewed any 
preconditioned principles driven by promethean 
architects in favor of a full immersion into the real 
context to discover existing practices, matters and 
dynamics. The raw materials collected during the 
rigorous diagnosis of the context were used to 
establish the planning directives, to build up the 
scenario debate and finally to ground the multi-
tude of interlaced aspects that structured the final 
proposal.
The significance of this strategic development 
lies first in its timing, given the critical political and 
security situation in Tripoli. Secondly, this project 
explores how inclusive urban strategies can engage 
in reconciliation and yield benefits for peace building 
processes in divided cities, addressing the conflict 
zone as an integral part of wider local and national 
contexts. Thirdly, it aims to achieve reconciliation 
by addressing critical, social, cultural and physical 
issues in a dispersed manner, directly operating 
through physical changes in the urban fabric – its 
voids and linear breaks – drawing strategic connec-
tions and allowing urban cohesion. Finally, the 
strategy aims to merge previous lessons learnt in 
a holistic approach that represents a paradigmatic 
shift from reconciliation as reconstruction to recon-
ciliation as an urban renovation for the future. 
The Tripoli Green Line and the Dawn of 
Prosperity
Tripoli is the second largest city of Lebanon. Its 
region is called Al-Fayhâ and includes Tripoli 
(229,369 inhabitants), Al-Mina (54,052 inhabitants), 
the city’s port, and Beddawy (36,763 inhabitants, 
including the Palestinian refugee camp popula-
tion).19 Tripoli's long history crosses the Phoenician, 
Greek, Roman and Mamaluk domination until the 
presence of the Ottomans between the fifteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries. For centuries, relation-
ships of trade, culture, and kinship flourished with 
alternative scenario that could reach a multitude of 
interlaced objectives. Some objectives were clear 
from the beginning and shared among all the part-
ners: harmonising different initiatives and efforts 
and planning investments for future funding in an 
inclusive and sustainable approach; addressing the 
spatial segregation between neighbourhoods and 
the break of historic socio-economic ties between 
them and the city of Tripoli to achieve physical, 
economic and socio-cultural linkages; enhancing 
the livability of these neighbourhoods by improving 
their economy, culture and mix of functions and 
people; celebrating this area as a reconcilia-
tion zone to counteract the rise of violence and to 
reach a long-term peace among conflicting parties; 
adopting innovative solutions to address poverty, 
illiteracy and unemployment that lead to social 
desperation; improving access to basic infrastruc-
ture and upgrading current infrastructure systems; 
strengthening the local distinctiveness of communi-
ties and their sense of belonging but also presenting 
Tripoli in a new light; and planning for sustainable 
growth in setting a vision for the future. 
The development of the work was structured 
to allow a constant dialogue among all the actors 
involved to try to achieve a shared and realisable 
vision. The work is divided into two parts: the diag-
nosis – including different studies that had been 
intersected – and the strategy and action plan. The 
diagnosis part includes the study of the physical 
setting, household surveys and the benchmarking 
of divided cities, strategies in post-conflict areas, 
and urban design methodologies. This large body 
of information was intersected through a SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) 
analysis to initially formulate planning directives, 
a list of general intentions, and successively to 
build three alternative urban scenarios that could 
help to trigger debates and confrontations. The 
second part of the research includes the strategy 
in all its aspects: the vision; the strategy that illus-
trates physical transformations and interventions; 
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control between March 14 Alliance, a coalition 
opposing the Syrian regime, and March 8 Alliance, 
a pro-Syrian group, both formed in 2005 during 
the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Since then and 
throughout the ongoing war to defend or dethrone 
the Assad regime in Syria, the situation has spiraled 
into a cycle of violence, leaving the most deprived 
and densely populate areas deeply impoverished.
The war in Syria since 2011 has had undeni-
able repercussions in Tripoli and particularly in 
Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen. The arrival 
of Syrian Alawites and Sunni refugees in large 
numbers in these two neighbourhoods has intensi-
fied the conflicts since 2008. Both rival groups further 
demarcated their territories, enhancing the already 
evident spatial and social seclusion. Moreover, the 
arrival of Syrian refugees posed a real menace to 
the fragile economic and social structure of the city, 
because they could take any job accepting lower 
wages than what locals used to accept. 
The civil war, the regional political instability and 
the economic crisis that followed contributed to 
Tripoli's isolation. Its historic role as a place of admin-
istration, economy, culture, and tertiary services 
was disrupted, affecting its regional relevance. 
Furthermore, the size of the Tripoli metropolitan 
region grew enormously in a response to rural 
migration, increasing the levels of urban poverty (in 
2009, Tripoli and the North were home to 30 percent 
of the poor families of Lebanon).22 Nevertheless, the 
Old City is the second best preserved Mamaluk city 
after Cairo, and its landmarks (madrassas, khans, 
hammams, and mosques) and its urban fabric 
represent an important medieval Islamic heritage. 
Its physical structure is continually degraded by the 
encroachment of unauthorised construction and 
of uncontrolled urban growth. The demographic 
changes, tenuous circumstances and deteriorating 
economic conditions discourage property owners 
from investing in the maintenance of their proper-
ties, and have led to the decay of the urban fabric.23
little care for nationality or religion. The prosperity of 
the city was due to its specific geographical position 
that allowed it to assume a relevant role in trade and 
commerce, enhanced by the competition with cities 
like Beirut and Saida. This rich past is still present 
in the historical core of Al-Mina, the cathedral (know 
today as the Al-Mansuri Mosque) and the citadel 
of Saint Gilles, which marks the presence of the 
crusaders (1109–1289). These are the main land-
marks of the area and also the most famous tourist 
attractions. The city’s past commercial prosperity 
is still evident today in the proliferation of khans, 
mosques and baths.
 Tripoli society was always considered peaceful 
and advanced. Various neighbourhoods – char-
acterised by families and residents from different 
religions and backgrounds – were deeply inter-
woven until the Lebanese Civil War of the 1980s, 
which caused the strong sectarian demarcation 
among neighbourhoods that still persists today.20 
Syria-aligned Lebanese Alawites aggregated 
into Jebel Mohsen and fought against the Sunni 
Tawhid movement which was mainly based in Bab 
Al-Tabbaneh. Tensions among the two communi-
ties remained throughout the civil war. After the war, 
the tribal segregation persisted in the old sectors 
of the city and spread into the newly built resi-
dencial areas. During the war years, Tripoli had a 
dual and contradictory identity: on the one hand, 
the aspiration of being an important international 
centre, displayed in the unfinished construction of 
the Rashid International Fair by Oscar Niemeyer in 
the 1970s;21 on the other hand, the protraction of the 
Lebanese Civil War interrupted urban growth and 
negatively affected social and economic dynamics. 
The consequence was an increasing national and 
international marginalisation. 
The Arabic Democratic Party of Jebel Mohsen 
re-armed in 2007 after the threat of Fath Al-Islam, 
a radical Sunni Islamic group. Fights erupted again 
the following year in violent battles for government 
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and the city centre. 
The topography also influenced the urban organi-
sation and the circulation system. Neighbourhoods 
on hills adjacent to the river are connected by a 
network of staircases and winding streets that create 
a unique character and a high level of pedestrian 
traffic. The streets follow the contour lines of the 
hills, integrating the stairs into a complex network 
that infiltrates the urban fabric and flows into some 
important open spaces along the river (the market 
space and a small sport field). In this chaotic 
network, the market emerges as the main economic 
and spatial structure. Because of the segregation 
inflicted by the war, the market, once of regional 
relevance, has seen its area of influence restricted 
to local inhabitants on this side of the river.
The dense network of streets defines the spatial 
configuration of the city, which responds to social 
values attached to privacy and protection through 
a separation of private and public spaces. Main 
streets are usually informally occupied by vendors, 
backgammon players, women sweeping their 
doorsteps and many other occasional practices, 
showing a vibrant and participative community. 
Notwithstanding, the living community has organ-
ised itself in enclosed family circles leaving the main 
public spaces and squares empty because they are 
considered unsafe.
The urban setting presents a great variety of 
buildings and urban structures, making this complex 
patchwork of great interest. It is a combination of 
vernacular buildings that follow the complex organic 
patterns of the streets, dating back to the formation 
of the Ummayad city, with varied small-scale building 
shapes intricately connected. Regular grids and 
large building blocks demarcate the shift towards 
top-down urban planning implemented since the 
mid-twentieth century. Modern building regulations 
enforced a geometric land division, resulting in 
linear streets that cut through the vernacular fabric. 
Security tensions, political divisions and humani-
tarian crises have ruined the economy and provoked 
a dramatic isolation. Tripoli's poor reputation also 
affected its attractiveness and competitiveness, 
discouraging investments. Moreover the deprived 
urban conditions, the spread of unemployment, 
the abandonment of houses, the segregation, 
and absence of trust among neighbours and the 
municipality created a very critical and sensitive 
community. The necessity for urban renovation 
arises from social, economic and cultural needs, 
as well as from the need to end the ethnic conflict. 
This urban renovation should engender a general 
rebranding of Tripoli, which will be addressed both 
to the local Lebanese population and to tourists and 
foreigners.
Spatial syntax of the conflict
The conflict between communities has led to a 
partitioned city with isolated neighbourhoods. The 
demarcation line adjacent to Syria Street, the main 
road that connects Tripoli to Syria, identifies the 
border between opposed tribal groups. Here demol-
ished buildings, bullet holes in the walls and small 
fissures for snipers still vividly bear witness to the 
harshness of the clashes. 
Beyond these recent changes in human geog-
raphy, Tripoli has a very defined topography, and 
the Abu Ali River plays an important part in defining 
its geographical setting. The river crosses two hills, 
and separates the north-eastern section of the city, 
traditionally inhabited by the lower-income popula-
tion of Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen, from 
the historic city center towards the south. The river 
had always been a relevant element of connection 
and identification between the two opposite parts 
until its natural bed was altered in the 1960s, when 
concrete banks were constructed to address the 
problem of flooding. The result of this harsh opera-
tion is an impoverishment of the urban life and vast 
ecological damage; suddenly the river was turned 
into a physical separation between the East Bank 
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does not consider any existing circumstances, like 
the topography, the existing houses, or the ceme-
tery crossed by a new road. The municipal plan also 
foresaw the enlargement of some roads as an easy 
and effective transportation system, but without 
the adequate sensitivity and respect towards the 
existing urban fabric, and the plan will lead to the 
demolition of many traditional houses.
A most effective effort has been made with Tripoli 
Vision 2020, an apolitical initiative with a compre-
hensive approach to accelerate the development 
of the city.25 Tripoli Vision 2020 is in essence 
a plan that aims to reshape both the local and 
national economy, by strengthening infrastructures, 
promoting employment and training, supporting 
start-ups and funding new initiatives.26
Building scenarios for possible futures
One of the priorities of the Inclusive Urban Strategy 
and Action Plan was to learn from the context and 
to bring to the fore distinctive features that could 
nurture optimistic and effective visions for the 
future. The huge amount of information collected 
in the context study – the historic study, the 
morphological analysis, the household survey, the 
socio-economic survey – culminated in the SWOT 
matrix, a well know strategic planning method that 
offers an evaluation and summary of the combined 
results.27 Applying the SWOT analysis to the post-
conflict situation helps to draw priorities and to 
trigger participation and confrontation.28 The SWOT 
matrix was arranged thematically, with a special 
focus on the spatial, environmental, infrastructure 
and mobility aspects and their interrelations with 
social, economic, political and security aspects.
The studied area is characterised by a strong 
urban setting, an efficient pedestrian network, a 
traditional urban fabric and a unique topography, 
although impoverished and in a state of aban-
donment. Notwithstanding the conflict, life never 
disappeared, as main public structures – like 
The one kilometre-long Syria Street emerges as 
the main artery representing both an infrastructural 
break and a social boundary between areas. 
The consequences of the long-term conflict are 
evident in the widespread degradation: empty lots 
are used as garbage dumps, crumbling houses 
inhabited by large families lack bathrooms, vernac-
ular and historic heritage buildings are derelict and 
abandoned. The infrastructure systems – storm 
water drainage, waste water collection and solid 
waste management – is undersized and obsolete, 
and in a complete state of decay. These systems 
do not have the capacity to respond to the urban 
development pressure and the population increase. 
For example, several houses have resorted to the 
discharge of their sewage into irrigation canals or 
into the Abu Ali River, causing severe water, land 
and air pollution.24
Previous planning solutions have not proved 
successful, and have in fact further encouraged the 
spatial segregation. Three main interventions have, 
instead of bringing improvements, made things 
worse. In the 1990s the Cultural Heritage and Urban 
Development Office attempted to rehabilitate the 
urban role of the river by building a 280-metre-long 
platform connected to the central market. Although 
well-intentioned, the intervention did not reach its 
initial objective of linking the two banks through a 
system of public spaces, and today its surface is 
not used and market activities are still relegated to 
the eastern side of the river. A second intervention 
by President Hariri saw some social housing built 
uphill in Jebel Mohsen. These buildings introduced 
a different typology, scale, and building palette that 
disturb the urban landscape. Because it was initi-
ated by President Hariri, very close to the Alawites 
group, the housing project increased exclusion. 
Finally, the municipality provided a master plan for 
the new urban development towards the east, but its 
prescriptions were limited to the design of a regular 
grid suitable for large-scale speculation. This grid 
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accepted by the local community because such 
interventions would be embedded in the existing 
urban fabric already shared among the inhabitants.
Threats are particularly significant in post-conflict 
areas because of the presence of structural barriers 
and obstacles that menace the positive outcome of 
every kind of intervention. These structural barriers 
are caused by the weak nature of the state and 
the authorities, the presence of elite minorities that 
control business and land, the relevance of the 
informal sector as the most dynamic force in place, 
and the migration of the intellectual and entrepre-
neurial sector that impoverished the existing social 
pattern. Furthermore, political and ideological 
patterns may continue the conditions of hostility 
among former enemies. In such critical and fragile 
conditions, external actors should move cautiously 
to avoid misperceptions and even hindrance from 
locals. Empowering local institutions that demon-
strate a commitment to externally-determined goals 
may also enhance social inclusion.
All the aspects from the SWOT analysis were 
filtered with a benchmarking analysis of precedents 
from divided cities, post-conflict reconstruction and 
urban design solutions, to draw up the list of plan-
ning directives to achieve initial objectives. The 
main task of the planning directives was to inter-
lace spatial and infrastructure guidelines, a list of 
possible interventions that could be included in the 
strategy, with social and economic guidelines. This 
made it possible to isolate architecture and urban 
design with their possible future implications, high-
lighting the objectives they can reach in a broader 
and more holistic framework. Following such a 
complex and varied list of guidelines could be a 
hard task, considering the questions to face and the 
level of coherence and harmony that the strategy 
requires.
Guidelines were thus translated into three 
different scenarios, different hypotheses for the 
a school, a university campus, and the 
market – continued working without interruption. 
Recognising these strengths instead of considering 
the context a tabula rasa means using the raw 
material of the city to build a strategy that could be 
respectful of the population and of the local history.
Identifying strengths is a necessary step to 
balance the long list of weaknesses that could depict 
a wholly negative situation. Nonetheless, spatial, 
social, economic, environmental, infrastructural and 
mobility weaknesses are interwoven issues that 
cause a diffuse vulnerability and instability. If many of 
these dysfunctions are consequences of the conflict 
and of the dynamics generated by the ethnic parti-
tions, many are also engendered by urban politics 
implemented during the last decades. For example, 
issues related to accessibility, congestion and poor 
road conditions, or environmental issues like the 
pollution of the river, the malfunctioning sewage 
system and the inadequate infrastructure services 
are on the one hand the consequence of a planning 
deficit, but on the other hand their state worsened 
dramatically during the conflict. Weaknesses have 
a clear topographic and physical expression that 
can be easily identified in the shattered urban fabric 
as the material manifestation of social segregation, 
absence of collaboration and trust, and other social 
and economic issues.
Despite its having been a stage of war, the 
area has a well-established community. Many 
opportunities can be recognised in the existing 
underdeveloped or underrated structures, or in 
elements like the market, the heritage buildings, 
or the many neglected and decaying schools. 
The local population is vividly aware of all these 
elements, and eager to reclaim what they can. 
The presence of low-cost local labour, craftsmen, 
investors and possible voters gives rise to positive 
consideration for successful implementations. The 
study estimated that any interventions that would 
consider these opportunities would be favourably 
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conditions to trigger processes of recovery and 
therefore future development. 
The preferred scenario was developed as the 
outcome of the preceding scenario debate. The 
three different scenarios were presented and 
discussed with the Municipality Development Office 
and the Beyond Reform and Development Team. 
Each scenario has a clear objective and a simple 
structure, and it aims to function as a tool to trigger 
a debate focusing on priorities, to measure interests 
and more importantly, to consider incertitude and 
risks. [Fig. 6] Having considered all the interlaced 
aspects between the three scenarios, a fourth and 
final scenario came out as a merging between the 
previous three with the scope to tackle most of the 
issues presented during the debate. The variety of 
interventions that characterised each of the three 
scenarios was thus re-arranged into a system that 
includes the linear landscape framework (named 
‘urban armature’), large-scale projects with regional 
relevance (‘functional injections’), together with 
medium- and small-scale punctual interventions 
(‘multi-functional open spaces’).
As a tool for cooperation and negotiation, the 
fourth scenario was initially tested in a first workshop 
organised with the presence of local citizens, and a 
second workshop inviting NGOs active in the areas 
and schools from Bab Al-Tabbaneh, Qobbeh and 
Jebel Mohsen.29 During these workshops both the 
contents of the scenario as well as the possibility of 
its implementation were discussed. Citizens present 
in the first workshop expressed great interest and 
optimism for the significant changes that such plan 
would bring to the area. However the participants 
of the second workshop, because they come from 
a background of experiences with the civil society 
and they had been involved in other civic initiatives, 
were focused more on the process and worried that 
the presented plan would not be followed through. 
Feedback, opinions and reactions were received 
and used to inform the development of the strategy.
future, to easily transmit ideas to parties external 
to the process, and to engage them in what should 
effectively be a roundtable open to everyone. The 
first scenario proposed, ‘Renaturalisation’, aimed 
at creating new common environmentally friendly 
spaces and facilities by establishing a landscape 
framework to address social changes through envi-
ronmental issues. [Fig. 3] The second scenario was 
focused on one central element, the market (‘One 
Hub’) to reconnect the area with the old city border 
via socio-economic ties. The market was seen as the 
pulsating centre of a capillary system of secondary 
activities realised through medium- and small-scale 
punctual interventions, what amounts to commu-
nity centres and learning/capacity building centers 
to engage with personal and community initiatives. 
[Fig. 4] The third scenario, ‘City Scale Cohesion’, 
employs both large projects with a regional rele-
vance (health, sport, culture and a transportation 
hub), and small placemaking projects at the neigh-
bourhood scale, as acupuncture interventions at 
sensitive points. The scope of the scenarios is to 
rebuild trust with the municipality and reassert local 
distinctiveness. [Fig. 5]
The strategy and its implementation tools
Reconstruction is considered a way to build mutual 
trust among communities, to enhance the capacity 
for dialogue and agreements, and thus increase 
the readiness for peace among the former warring 
parties. Economic investments are not enough, 
because first it is necessary to create the conditions 
for a sustainable economy (a long-term challenge). 
The strategy should be considered a negotiation tool 
for re-establishing community relations among all 
stakeholders and as a way to rebuild trust between 
the population and the political sphere. This process 
may facilitate reconciliation on the basis of solving 
common problems relevant to the inhabitants and 
of great concern to the municipality. For this reason, 
instead of proposing concrete solutions, like pointing 
at specific reconstruction activities, the proposed 
strategy aims at initially generating the necessary 
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Fig. 3: Scenario 1: ‘Renaturalization’. Source: Abu Mrad et al., Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab 
Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen.
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Fig. 4: Scenario 2: ‘One Hub’. Source: Abu Mrad et al., Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh 
and Jebel Mohsen.
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Fig. 5: Scenario 3: ‘City-scale Cohesion’. Source: Abu Mrad et al., Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab 
Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen.
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Fig. 6: The three scenarios compared for the scenario debate. Source: Abu Mrad et al., Inclusive Urban Strategy and 
Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen.
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special buildings inserted at sensitive points in the 
existing context to blur the edges between the old 
city and the study area, or between the segregated 
neighbourhoods, following the principle of urban 
acupuncture. Large-scale buildings, like health 
services, sport facilities, a transportation hub and a 
theatre, are integrated with a socio-cultural platform 
made of cultural centers, youth- and employment 
offices. The socio-cultural programme will be 
injected into existing, currently abandoned heritage 
buildings. The rehabilitation of these buildings may 
also drive the empowerment of citizens through the 
recovery of a shared memory.
The ‘multi-functional open spaces’ constitute a 
public platform for informal appropriation. These 
new public spaces are planned to take place in 
unused or abandoned areas, and in damaged or 
polluted waste land. After an appropriate recovery 
of unclean surfaces, these re-discovered spaces 
may feature events and manifestations, may host 
sitting and meeting areas, while physical design 
elements will be placed to work as attractors. Low 
cost interventions like these allow the process to 
reach immediate results more quickly, and then to 
trigger a subsequent process. 
The three interlaced levels thus enhance and 
promote healing conditions through generating 
various planned and, more importantly, unplanned 
and unexpected consequences. Indeed the strategy 
includes not solely a set of interventions following 
a top-down process, but also aims to empower 
the citizens at various social levels through active 
involvement in many bottom-up initiatives. The 
strategy is thus configured as an open system that 
leaves space for the unplanned, a crucial factor in 
facing the unpredictability and incertitude of post-
conflict areas.
The action plan sets the guidelines for the imple-
mentation of the strategy thought phasing (pilot 
projects and a implementation timeline) and it 
The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan 
that was subsequently elaborated was organised 
into two interwoven parts: the Urban Strategy 
illustrates the spatial transformations of the urban 
context, while the Action Plan includes criteria 
and guidelines for its implementation. The Urban 
Strategy acts at three interlaced levels of interven-
tion: a network of public spaces to increase physical 
and visual permeability (the ‘urban armature’); func-
tional injection to sustain the local economy and 
to link conflicting communities (the ‘functional 
injections’); and a platform of public spaces that 
may trigger community participation in common 
activities to informally re-inhabiting outdoor spaces 
(‘multi-functional open spaces’). These levels are 
basically structured around different spatial aspects 
at different scales, selecting sensitive points and 
areas where intervening is considered crucial. As 
they comprise a complementary list of different 
topics, they also take into account the diverse scale 
of financial support, the different involvements of the 
various stakeholders, and they foresee a mixture of 
typologies of intervention. [Fig. 7]
The ‘urban armature’ is composed of the circu-
lation system and movement at ground level; it 
links major arteries, pedestrian paths, infrastruc-
tural elements like the river and the fragmented 
arrangement of small alleys and stairs, bridges and 
escalators.30 This may happen through the rehabili-
tation of public spaces, drawing new connections 
or reinforcing existing ones. This network may be 
integrated with an efficient system of light trans-
portation – Integrated Active Mobility – to facilitate 
movement at different speeds, and to improve 
accessibility and walkability. The scope of the urban 
armature is to physically connect the areas of the 
city that are now separated. 
The ‘urban armature’ is the structure where 
‘functional injections’ and ‘multi-functional open 
spaces’ are embedded, linking all these punctual 
interventions. ‘Functional injections’ are selected 
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Fig. 7: The matrix of interventions of the Inclusive Urban Strategy. Source: Abu Mrad et al., Inclusive Urban Strategy 
and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen.
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among stakeholders, disciplines, interests, and 
funds. The tools include both communication and 
advertising, as prior actions to share the vision and 
to obtain support, and project management tech-
niques to facilitate implementation of every stage 
of the intervention.33 Awareness and training tools, 
participatory tools, cross-disciplinary tools, legisla-
tive and regulatory tools, and technical tools form a 
complex mechanism that maximises inclusiveness, 
synchronises different efforts, manages side-
effects, and generates inclusiveness. At the same 
time, more importantly, these tools guarantee the 
initial social and economic benefits that can lead to 
enduring conditions of safety, recovery and peace. 
Conclusions
The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan is 
an attempt to translate post-conflict processes 
of reconstruction into a holistic urban design, to 
be realised with the urgency that post-conflict 
processes usually require.
The strategy can be considered a starting point 
for an in-depth detailed masterplan; the Municipality 
Development Office was asked to consolidate and 
use it as a negotiation tool with the relevant insti-
tutions and stakeholders in to order to achieve a 
more detailed action plan and a clear implementa-
tion timeline that takes into consideration budgets 
and availability of funds. Attributing to the local 
municipality the task of approving and initiating 
the process may be considered a first obstacle 
to a positive outcome. The strategy requires the 
significant involvement of the municipality, but it has 
until today avoided taking any part in the issue of 
Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen. Like in many 
divided cities, the municipal government is afraid 
to lose its neutrality if they intervene, condemning 
it to inactivity.34 Indeed, as the security plan imple-
mented in 2014 was a matter of national security, 
the shift of responsibilities to the local administra-
tion may look like a heavy burden. This is due to 
recommends a variety of implementation tools. The 
flexible, adaptable and retroactive configuration of 
the action plan takes into consideration the difficulty 
of programming and making decisions, probable 
risks, uncertain investments, and potential stake-
holders’ interests. Moreover the action plan aims 
at a constant and persistent involvement of every 
stakeholder in order to enhance the legitimacy of 
the strategy and citizen identification with it. 
Pilot projects are small architectural, landscape 
or engineering projects used as a testing ground; 
they pave the way for long-term public support 
and cooperation.31 They can also be used to test 
the strategy’s assumptions and the feasibility of the 
implementation at a small scale before investing 
in a larger-scale intervention. Pilot projects should 
be evaluated with a set of parameters before their 
execution, and immediately after their realiza-
tion, because their impacts may differ in various 
contexts. In the aftermath, it is important to assess 
the impact on citizens, to allow them to slowly adapt 
to the changes, and to get used to the active pres-
ence of the municipality in the field. The success 
of a pilot project may help to raise funds more 
rapidly as investors may feel more confident in the 
success of the operation.32 Pilot projects are just 
the first step in the implementation timeline that 
follows the same principles: testing the ground and 
in case of success, moving forward with larger inter-
ventions that require greater financial support. For 
this reason the implementation timeline includes a 
large series of activities, workshops, communica-
tion, meetings, and confrontations. The benefits are 
twofold: testing and proving, and on the other hand 
optimising time and resources.
Provided along with the phasing are a set of imple-
mentation tools that function in the framework of the 
strategy. These tools offer prescriptions and guide-
lines on how to manage the process, to support it, 
and how to establish participation and collaboration 
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of the political scenario that will support the strategy 
more decisively, what remains is an initial study for 
a holistic urban strategy that tackles many open and 
problematic issues in the panorama of post-conflict 
reconstruction processes. 
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